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REMAPPING CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

The time has come for constitutional theory to move beyond the
stale argument between originalists and living constitutionalists. The
declining significance of that debate provides a motivating backdrop
for this Article, but it is not the main point of the discussion. Instead,
this Article focuses on the possibility of remapping constitutional
disagreement in a fresher, more generative, and more descriptively
accurate fashion.
The discussion begins with another familiar dichotomy – the
distinction between “judicial activism” and “judicial restraint.”
Unfortunately, as employed in popular discussion and in some
academic literature, this distinction is also confused and unhelpful.
However, we can begin to make progress if we recognize that there
are subdivisions on both the activism and restraint side of the ledger.
Judicial activists are divided between libertarians and
interventionists. Libertarian activists want judges to be active to
force or encourage the political branches to be more passive. In
contrast, interventionist activists want judges to be active to force or
encourage the political branches to be more active.
There is a parallel divide on the judicial restraint side of the line.
Some believers in judicial restraint are deferentialists. They want to
restrain judges by requiring them to defer to decisions made by other
actors.
In contrast, other believers in judicial restraint are antidiscretionists. They too believe in limiting the power of judges, but
for them, the worry takes the form of insisting on rules that limit
judicial discretion.
This new map focuses our attention on questions that should
matter even if they don’t or don’t always. The future of the republic
does not turn on issues about linguistics and interpretive theory,
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especially when it is unclear whether resolution of these issues affects
the results in real cases. The future of the republic might well turn on
issues relating to the nature of liberty, the appropriate role for courts
when reasonable people disagree about constitutional meaning, and
the boundary between a public and private sphere.
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I. INTRODUCTION: MAPPING OUR CONSTITUTIONAL DISAGREEMENTS
How should we organize our constitutional disagreements?
For at least a generation, the debate has centered around an argument between
“originalists” and “living constitutionalists.” Speaking broadly, originalists hold
that judges should be bound by the text of the Constitution as understood at the time
of the framing.1 Living constitutionalists usually do not deny the relevance of
As one of its leading defenders has explained, “originalism” is a family of constitutional
theories united by the “Fixation Thesis,” which holds that the original meaning of constitutional text
is fixed at the time the provision was framed and ratified and the “Constraint Principle,” which holds
that constitutional actors should be constrained by the original meaning. Lawrence B. Solum, The
Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 6-7
(2015).
1
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constitutional text but insist that it should be given a modern meaning that is formed
or supplemented by prudential and moral considerations, contemporary
understandings, and the gloss provided by common law-like elaboration on the
text.2
The argument has gone stale.3 Advocates have staked out their positions in
sometimes numbing detail, and it is unlikely that further exploration of the
theoretical intricacies of each position will yield additional insight. More
significantly, the approaches have been refined and complexified in ways that make
the differences between them at best marginal and at worst nonexistent and unlikely
to determine the outcome of any real case.4 For these reasons, the time has come to
end the originalism/living constitutionalism debate.
For important originalist texts, see id; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional
Construction, 82 Ford. L. Rev. 458 (2013); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction
Distinction, 27 Const. Comment. 95 (2010); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists,
45 Loy. L. Rev. 611 (1999); Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: a
Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 Geo. L. J. 1 (2018); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a
Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution
and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 3 (Any Gutman ed.. 1997);
Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial
Review (1999); John McGinnis & Michael B, Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101
Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy, 68 (2007); William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum. L. Rev.
2349 (2015).
2
According to David Strauss, living constitutionalism’s leading proponent, a “living
constitution” is one that “evolves, changes over time, and adapts to new circumstance, without being
formally amended.” David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 1 (2010).
Like originalism, living constitutionalism encompasses a family of different views. For some
leading examples, see id.; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 163-84 (1997); Jack M. Balkin,
Living Originalism (2011); Morton J. Horowitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal
Fundamentality without Fundamentalism, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 30 (1993); Ernest Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C.
L. Rev 619 (1994); Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737 (2007);
James Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and against
Originalism (2015).
3
See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, The New Doctrinalism in Constitutional Scholarship and
District of Columbia v. Heller, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 789, 794 (2008) (characterizing the debate between
originalists and nonoriginalists as “stalemated (and stale)”).
4
Cf. Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Itself Impure: The Life Cycle Theory of. Legal
Theories, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1819, 1884-85 (2016) (noting that originalism, like other prescriptive
theories, “balloon with exceptions, metaprocedures, and side constraints [that] fail to simplify or
constrain the work of decision; they actually dramatize the value-laden conflicts that the early
proponents of these theories had promised to defuse.”); Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New
Originalism, 99 Geo. L. J. 713, 749-50 (2011) (“In practice, one cannot help but be struck by the
extent to which the New Originalism's decision-making process mirrors that of its nonoriginalist
rivals”); Daniel E. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide to the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L. Rev
1085, 1087 (noting that “moderate originalists may be difficult to distinguish from nonoriginalists”);
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The declining significance of that debate provides a motivating backdrop for
the discussion that follows, but it is not the main point of the discussion. Instead,
this Article focuses on the possibility of remapping constitutional disagreement in
a fresher, more generative and more descriptively accurate fashion.
The discussion begins with another familiar dichotomy – the distinction
between “judicial activism” and “judicial restraint.” Unfortunately, as employed in
popular discussion and in some academic literature, this distinction is also confused
and unhelpful.5 However, we can begin to make progress if we recognize that there
are subdivisions on both the activism and restraint side of the ledger.
Judicial activists are divided between libertarians and interventionists.
Libertarian activists want judges to be active to force or encourage the political
branches to be more passive. They associate freedom with a private sphere
protected from government regulation and look to an active judiciary to prevent
government overreach. In contrast, interventionist activists want judges to be active
to force or encourage the political branches to be more active. They associate
freedom with government regulation of powerful private interests and government
assistance for disadvantaged groups. They look to an active judiciary to goad the
political branches into intervention that accomplishes these objectives.
There is a parallel divide on the judicial restraint side of the line. Some
believers in judicial restraint are deferentialists. They want to restrain judges by
requiring them to defer to decisions made by other actors. The actors might be
government officials, but they might also be private individuals making personal
choices in their market and nonmarket activities. Deferentialist judges believe in
Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism Debate, 15 Const. Comm. 411, 431
(1998) (“Once strict originalism is taken off the table . . . there are no stakes left to arguing about
the originalism question.”)
5
For use of the term in academic literature to mean different things, see, e.g., Thomas Merrill,
Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 Const. Comm. 271 (2005)
(associating judicial restraint with predictability); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably
Erroneous Precedent, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1, 52 (2001) (associating judicial restraint with respect for
constitutional text); David. A. Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 34 Harv.
J. L. & Pub. Poly., 137 (2011) (associating judicial restraint with respect for precedent).
For examples of popular confusion and controversy over the concept, see, e.g., Ruth Marcus,
“Where did all the conservative hand-wringing over judicial restraint go,” The Washington Post
(April 29, 2022).
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restraint because they are doubtful of their own authority, wisdom, and expertise
and are happy to accept judgments made by political actors or by individuals acting
in their private capacity.
In contrast, other believers in judicial restraint are anti-discretionists. They too
believe in limiting the power of judges, but for them, the worry takes the form of
insisting on rules that limit judicial discretion. The rules might be derived from
constitutional text whether understood in an originalist or living constitutional
fashion, but they need not be. They might also come from respect for prior
decisions, from other forces that restrict judicial power, from other systems of
thought, or from self-imposed guideposts. Anti-discretionists differ from
deferentialists because the rules anti-discretionists insist upon do not necessarily
require deference. The rules might also require judges to make independent
judgments that conflict with the judgments of government officials or private
actors. Whereas deferentialists believe that judges should leave important
decisions to others, anti-discretionists are happy to allow judges to decide so long
as they don’t make things up as they go along.
Once one understands these divisions, it becomes evident that adherents to the
differing versions of judicial activism on the one hand and judicial restraint on the
other are often enemies rather than allies. Moreover, adherents to one version of
judicial activism may be allied with adherents to another version of judicial
restraint.
The relationship between these positions is complicated, but a few simple
examples illustrate how the positions interact in real cases. Consider, first the
division between judicial activists. Historically, interventionist activism has been
associated with the left, but more recently, some conservatives have embraced this
stance.
Carson v. Makin6 provides an example. Maine granted tuition assistance to
parents living in school districts that did not operate secondary schools. Parents
had considerable freedom to send their children to private or public schools, but the
assistance came with the qualification that the school must be “nonsectarian.”7 The
Supreme Court held that this discrimination violated the first amendment’s free
exercise clause as incorporated in the fourteenth amendment.8

6
7
8

142 S. Ct. 1987 (2022).
Id. at 1993-94.
Id. at 1997.
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As the Court emphasized, Maine could respond to the decision by terminating
the assistance program for everyone,9 but no one expected the state to choose this
course. Instead, the simplest way for the state to respond was by becoming more
active—that is, by extending the state subsidy to additional private schools.10
Moreover, the Court’s suggestions for how Maine might avoid this outcome –
expanding the reach of its public school system, spending more money on
transportation, providing a combination of tutoring, remote learning and partial
attendance, or operating state boarding schools – all involve more government
activity.11 Maine seems to have rejected all these suggestions, but instead has
responded with an even deeper invasion into the private sphere. It has provided the
subsidies to children attending sectarian schools, but also vowed to extend the
protection of its Human Rights Act to all private schools benefiting from the tuition
benefits.12
The Court’s interventionist activism of Carson contrasts with its libertarian
activism of Wisconsin v. Yoder,13 another education case in which a free exercise
clause claim prevailed. In Yoder, the Court invalidated Wisconsin’s compulsory
education law as applied to Amish children of high school age whose parents had
a religious objection to the further education of their children.14 Like the decision
in Carson, Yoder recognized a claim based on religious liberty. But this time, the
decision prohibited state intervention. The holding meant that the state could no
longer regulate some decisions about the education of Amish children. Whereas
Carson put pressure on the state to become more active by intervening in otherwise
private markets, Yoder forced the state to become more passive by withdrawing
from a private realm of choice.
Religion cases also offer examples of the division between deferentialists and
anti-discretionists on the restraint side of the ledger. Consider, for example, the
majority and dissenting opinion in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New
York v. Cuomo15. At the height of the Covid epidemic, New York Governor
Id., at 2000 (‘Maine chose to allow some parents to direct state tuition payments to private
schools; that decision was not ‘forced upon’ it.’”)
10
For a more detailed discussion of use of the equality requirement to encourage government
intervention, see TAN xx, supra.
11
Id.
12
See “Statement of Maine Attorney General Aaron Frey on Supreme Court Decision in Carson
v. Makin,” Newswire (June 21, 2022) available at https://www.einnews.com
/pr_news/577857221/statement-of-maine-attorney-general-aaron-frey-on-supreme-court-decisionin-carson-v-makin.
13
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
14
Id. at 234.
15
141 S. Ct. 63 (2020).
9
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Andrew Cuomo issued an executive order limiting the number of persons who
could attend religious services. Plaintiffs challenged the order on free exercise
grounds, and the Supreme Court granted emergency relief enjoining the order.16
The Court’s majority adopted an anti-discretionist stance. For these justices,
judicial restraint meant adhering to a constitutional command even when members
of the political branches made policy arguments pushing in the other direction.
While recognizing that “[m]embers of this Court are not public health experts,”
the Court insisted that “even in a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away
and forgotten. The restrictions at issue here, by effectively barring many from
attending religious services, strike at the very heart of the First Amendment’s
guarantee of religious liberty.”17
In contrast, some of the dissenters adopted the deferentialist version of judicial
restraint. Writing for himself and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor, Justice Breyer
stated that:
We have previously recognized that courts must grant elected officials
“broad” discretion when they “undertake to act in areas fraught with
medical and scientific uncertainties.” . . . That is because the “Constitution
principally entrusts the safety and the health of the people to the politically
accountable officials of the States.” . . . The elected branches of state and
national governments can marshal scientific expertise and craft specific
policies in response to “changing facts on the ground.” . . . And they can do
so more quickly than can courts.18
As these cases illustrate, there is a complex relationship between various forms
of activism and restraint. For example, anti-discretionist restraint might be coupled
with interventionist activism. Perhaps the rules in place give the justices no choice
but to require state intervention in an otherwise private sphere. In Carson, the
majority argued for interventionist activism, but that stance was supported by antidiscretionist restraint. The Court’s majority thought that constitutional text left it
with no option but to grant the plaintiff’s claim.19
At first, it might be thought that libertarian activism is inconsistent with
deferentialist restraint. By insisting that the state could not force Amish students
to attend school, the Yoder Court necessarily discounted the state’s expertise on
16

Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 68.
18
Id. at 78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
19
See Carson v. Makin, 142 S. Ct., at 1997 (characterizing constitutional principles involved as
“unremarkable” and “basic.”)
17
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education.20 But that conclusion holds only if deferentialism is limited to respect
for state authority. Often, libertarians argue for protection of a private sphere on
the ground that government should defer to the wisdom of private judgments about,
for example, child rearing21 or the allocation of goods and services.22 When that is
true, deferentialist restraint can provide a powerful ally for libertarian activism.
But although the justices mixed and matched various forms of restraint and
activism in the opinions discussed above, none of those opinions engaged with the
originalism/living constitutionalism controversy. Of course, the positions of the
various justices overlapped with the controversy. Inteventionists and libertarians
might each ground their stance on either original public meaning or on a living
constitutionalist method of interpretation. Similarly, anti-discretionists might bind
themselves to constitutional text as understood in either originalist or living
constitutionalist fashion. Deferentialists might ground their deference in either
originalist or living constitutionalist notions of separation of powers or the
autonomy of a private sphere. But in each case, the actual resolution of the dispute
does not turn on adopting a particular mode of interpretation, and the opinions of
the justices barely mention interpretive methodology.
Instead, what is at stake in these arguments are older and more important
controversies. The controversies are about the appropriate role for government in
a free society and about the appropriate role for courts when reasonable people
disagree about constitutional meaning. A remapping of constitutional theory draws
our attention to these disputes and away from arcane and overly theoretical debates
about interpretive methodology.
It does not follow that views about these controversies motivate the justices,
any more than the justices are motivated by originalism or living constitutionalism.
For apparently instrumental reasons, the justices regularly and shamelessly switch
between restraint and activism and between different versions of restraint and
activism.23 Sorting out the actual determinates of judicial behavior is an immensely

See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S., at 234 (“the Amish have introduced persuasive evidence
undermining the arguments the State has advanced to support its claims in terms of the welfare of
the child and society as a whole.”)
21
See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (“It is through the
family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”)
22
See, e.g., Frederich A. Hayek, Hayek on Hayek: An Autobiographical Dialogue 69 (1994)
(arguing that “[The market is] a system of the utilization of knowledge which nobody can possess
as a whole, which . . .leads people to aim at the needs of people whom they do not know, make use
of facilities about which they have no direct information.”)
23
See TAN x, infra.
20
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complicated, probably impossible task and is well beyond the scope of this
Article.24
Why, then, should we bother to remap constitutional theory? The first, and
most modest answer, is that obsessive focus on the originalism/living
constitutionalism divide has blinded us to other controversies that complicate any
descriptive or normative account of judicial behavior. This modest claim suggests
that, at a minimum, the map I propose should supplement discussions of
constitutional law focusing on interpretive methodology.
A second, less modest, claim is that remapping should displace those
discussions. That is because my map focuses our attention on questions that should
matter even if they don’t or don’t always. The future of the republic does not turn
on issues about linguistics and interpretive theory, especially when it is unclear
whether resolution of these issues affects the results in real cases. The future of the
republic might well turn on issues relating to the nature of liberty, the appropriate
role for courts when reasonable people disagree about constitutional meaning, and
the boundary between a public and private sphere.
A final claim, not modest at all, is that focus on the restraint/activism divide
might point us toward an overlapping consensus about the role of constitutionalism
and judicial review in twenty-first century America. A striking fact about the map
that I draw is that it emphasizes reasonable disagreement rather than a supposedly
uncontroversial mediating discourse. If the map is accurate, then it might lead to
the abandonment of the false claim that the “right” version of constitutional law –
say, originalism or living constitutionalism – should settle our disagreements. And
that abandonment might, in turn, lead to a new agreement that we should learn to
live with nonsettlement. Instead of depending on authoritarian claims rooted in
constitutional commands to hold us together, a remapping might nurture nonlegal
norms of tolerance and restraint. The sheer necessity of sharing a geographical
space with others with whom we disagree might lead us to depend less on
constitutional law and more on what Lincoln called “mystic chords of memory”
and the “better angels of our nature.”25
24

For an introduction to the huge literature devoted to this problem, see Lee Epstein &
Jack Knight, The Choices Judges Make (1993); Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold Spaeth, The Supreme
Court and the Attitudinal Model (1993). For a skeptical view, see Harry T. Edwards & Michael A.
Livermore, Pitfalls in Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate
Decision Making, 56 Duke L. J. 1895 (2009).
25
Abraham
Lincoln,
The
First
Inaugural
Address
available
at
https://www.bartleby.com/124/pres31.html.
Although common, invocation of Lincoln’s appeal to unity paradoxically invites controversy.
His reference to our supposedly shared history and to fellowship were designed to avoid a civil war
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Of course, there are other alternative maps that might also describe our practices
and serve these ends. One might organize our constitutional disagreements along
lines that emphasize the split between formalists and realists, between
consequentialists and deontologists, between populists and progressives, between
egalitarians and supremacists, between advocates of natural law and advocates of
natural rights, between rebels and traditionalists, or between Democrats and
Republicans. Each of these maps would also temper our obsession with interpretive
theory, and I am open to all of them.
Another alternative approach might emphasize the gaps in the map I draw and
the confusion those gaps generate. An external critic, bent on demonstrating the
incoherence of our practices could, with work, demonstrate that the categories that
I discuss here, as well as the categories emphasized by alternative maps, generate
contradiction rather than resolution. On occasion, I have been such a critic, so I am
also sympathetic to this project. I have no problem with readers who busy
themselves deconstructing my categories and distinctions and use my argument to
demonstrate the incoherence of the entire project of American constitutionalism.
It turns out, then, that other maps are possible and that all maps are vulnerable
to skeptical critique. Still, for (the perhaps declining number of) people whose
point of view remains within our practices, the map I draw here has meaning and
helps organize thought – or, at least, that is my argument. This article engages in
internalist introspection. My claim is that for those still within our practices, the
map I suggest clarifies issues that have been muddied and suggests solutions that
have been overlooked.26 These are good enough reasons to try something new.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three parts.

that, perhaps, needed to be fought. No one should ignore the fact that, in the same address, he
indicated a willingness to tolerate the continued existence of slavery if necessary to preserve the
Union. See id. (stating that he had no objection to passage of the “Corwin Amendment” to the
Constitution, which would have permanently entrenched slavery). If one believes today, as some
believed then, that the American Union is no longer worth saving, or that a civil war is required to
reformulate a Union that is worth saving, then the map that I suggest here has little value. Cf.
Sanford Levinson, Perpetual Union, “Free Love,” and Secession: On the Limits of “Consent of the
Governed,” 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 457, 462 (2004) (finding that Lincoln’s argument against secession in
the First Inaugural amounted to “a series of question-begging, more-than-a-bit tendentious
arguments that ultimately persuade only those who wish to be persuaded in the first place.”)
26
I am conscious of, but do not to address here, a large meta-question: Whether an internalist
perspective is appropriate if one thinks that our practices are hopelessly corrupt and degraded.
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Part Two sets the stage by elaborating on the assertion that the
originalism/living constitutionalism debate has reached a dead end.
Part Three contains the heart of my argument. It sets out in more detail the
divides between activism and restraint and between various versions of activism
and restraint; illustrates the ways in which the argument has played out in the
context of various doctrinal disputes; and connects the approaches to broader
themes in legal and political theory.
Part Four explores the conclusions that might flow from this remapping. At a
minimum viewing constitutional law through this lens provides a richer and more
accurate account of the issues that divide us. More broadly, the clearer lens allows
us to see areas where opposing sides in our constitutional disputes might agree.
II. THE END OF THE ROAD
Given my claim that too much ink has already been wasted on the
originalism/living constitutionalism debate, it would defeat my purpose to provide
a lengthy summary of the debate here. Instead of delving into all the theoretical
intricacies already uncovered by participants in the debate, I offer a brief
explanation for why our current maps have led us to a road that dead ends. I divide
the discussion into the descriptive and normative claims made by the theories.
A. Descriptive Claims
One standard move in the originalism/living constitutionalism debate is to insist
that the other side’s theory lacks connection to our actual practice of constitutional
law. On the one hand, originalists claim that the Supreme Court never admits to
disobeying constitutional text and rarely suggests that the meaning of text changes
over time.27 On the other hand, living constitutionalists point to the rarity of
discussion of original public meaning in Supreme Court decisions and to the
willingness of justices claiming to be originalists to depart from that meaning when
it serves their purposes.28
See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y
817, 871 (2015) (emphasis in original) (“[I]f you go into court in a constitutional case and say ‘well,
Judge, the original Constitution is against us, but we superseded it through an informal amendment
in 1937,’ you will lose.”); William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law, 115 Colum. L Rev. 2352, 2371
(2015) (arguing that when there is conflict between original or textual meaning and another source
of meaning, text and original meaning prevail and that across a large run of case that do not feature
explicit clash of methodologies, Supreme Court never contradicts originalism)
28
See, e.g. David Strauss, The Living Constitution 52-62 (2010) (arguing that most of first
amendment law is not grounded in text or original understanding); Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity,
27
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These criticisms mostly miss the mark. Of course, a theory that has no
connection with our practices is of no more than – well – theoretical interest.29 But
most theories are intended to have critical bite. So long as theories have some
possibility of being implemented, real world departures from them are not
refutations. Instead, they provide motivation to reform our practices.
My descriptive claim is different. I will argue that even if the theories were
adopted and faithfully followed by judges, they fail to grapple with key
controversies about our constitutional practice.
A useful theory of constitutional law must respond to three questions. First, as
a substantive matter, what is the meaning of the Constitution and how should that
meaning be ascertained? Second, if there is good faith and reasonable disagreement
about the meaning or about the method by which the meaning should be
ascertained, which institution should have final interpretive authority? Third, once
meaning is authoritatively established, should the provision bind political Nd
judicial actors?
At best, originalists and living constitutionalists respond only to the first
question. They provide conflicting methods by which we can determine the
Constitution’s meaning. But many constitutional disputes concern the second and
third questions.
For example, although the Supreme Court has asserted from the beginning that
it has the authority to determine “what the law is,”30 rational basis review in some
equal protection, due process, free speech, and federalism cases cedes final
interpretive authority to the political branches at least so long as they act
“rationally.”31 One version of the political question doctrine32 and much of the
70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 381, 412 (1987) (citing many cases where Supreme Court has departed from
original text and understanding); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1,
91-92 (2009) (arguing that conservative position on affirmative action contradicts original
understanding of fourteenth amendment).
29
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How To Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 535, 549
(1999) (“A good constitutional theory must fit either the written Constitution or surrounding
practice. In the absence of a fit requirement, constitutional theory would lose its anchor in law and
collapse into political theory.”)
30
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 37, 177 (1803).
31
See generally Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978).
32
See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (holding that although political
gerrymandering may violate the constitution, the issue is nonjusticiable); Nixon v. United States,
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Court’s remedial jurisprudence33 recognizes that political actors are not always
bound by judicially enforced constitutional commands, and the extensive political
science literature demonstrating that judges are often motivated by extra-legal
considerations34 suggests that something other than disinterested constitutional
exegesis drives some outcomes. These cases suggest that the third question is also
on the table. Yet, neither living constitutionalism nor originalism has much to
contribute to the understanding of these phenomena.
Moreover, even if we focus on the first question, resolution of the
originalism/living constitutionalism debate makes much less difference than many
suppose. Uniform adoption of at least certain versions of either approach would
leave a description of the practice of constitutional law mostly or entirely
unchanged. Put more succinctly, even if implemented, the theories don’t much
matter.
Jack Balkin’s famous if controversial35 claim that Roe v. Wade36 was rightly
decided on originalist grounds37 provides the best empirical example supporting
this assertion. From the beginning, the whole point of originalism was to provide
a theoretical place to stand from which “activist” decisions like Roe could be
attacked. If Roe is compatible with originalism, then originalism no longer has
much point.38
For just this reason, many originalists have made more or less frantic efforts to
prove that Balkin’s claim is wrong.39 Without engaging with those specific efforts
506 U.S. 224 (1993) (holding that issues about whether impeachment proceedings met the
constitutional definition of a trial are nonjusticiable).
33
See, e.g., Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793 (2022) (sharply limiting availability of implied cause
of action for constitutional violations by federal officials); Stafford United School Dist. v. Redding,
557 U.S. 364 (2009) (“official immunity” doctrine bars suit for damages against state officials for
constitutional violation).
34
For a useful discussion of the range of factors motivating judges, see Lee Epstein & Jack
Knight, Reconsidering Judicial Preferences, 16 Am. Rev. Pol. Sci. 11 (2013). See also note x,
supra.
35
See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Living Originalism: The Magical Mystery Tour, 3 Tex. A & M L. Rev.
31, 35 (2015).
36
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
37
See Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 214-18 (2011); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original
Meaning, 24 Const. Comm. 291 (2007).
38
Cf. Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 2011, 213-14 (2012) (“If
originalism can validate a constitutional right to abortion . . . conservatives who seek to undermine
the legacy of the Warren and Burger Courts must go back to the drawing board.”)
39
See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Living Originalism, at 214-18, note x, supra; John O. McGinnis &
Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretative Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 Const. Comm.
371, 381 (2007).
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here, I want to suggest reasons why his claim is at least plausible and why, more
broadly, no justice need change a substantive position she currently holds if she
accepts either originalist or living constitutionalist dogma.
We can start by examining the claims of living constitutionalists. Because their
theory rejects the supposed constraints provided by a text with a fixed meaning,
they are vulnerable to the charge of letting judicial discretion run wild.40 And
because they are sensitive to this accusation, they have gone to some lengths to
mold their theory in a way that meets the charge.
Most living constitutionalists are ready to concede that text almost always
matters and is sometimes dispositive. In particular, where text is unambiguous and
not open textured, judges are bound to follow it.41 I know of no living
constitutionalist who asserts that Congress could lawfully mandate a presidential
term of five years or authorize the election of twenty-five years old presidents.
The area of dispute, then, is limited to constitutional text that is more open
textured. But here, too, living constitutionalists argue that judicial power is
constrained. Even if not restricted to original meaning, judges are limited by their
own prior decisions, by tradition, by social norms, and by common law
methodology.42
How different are these claims from the claims advanced by originalists? The
short answer is, much less different than one might suppose.43 The starting point
40

See, e.g., Robert Bork, Commentary: The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the
Constitution, 1979 Wash U. L. Q. 695, 696 (1979) (arguing that nontextual approaches to
constitutional law permit judges to create any rights that they want); William Van Alstyne,
Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of Special Theories of Judicial Review,
35 U. Fla. L. Rev. 209, 225-26 (1983) (same).
41
See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Legitimacy, “Constitutional Patriotism” and the Common Law
Constitution, 126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 50, 50 (2013) (“It is a fixed point of our legal system that
the text of the Constitution is binding, in the sense that no argument about constitutional law can
disregard the language of the text.”)
42
See generally David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution (2010); Philip Chase Bobbitt,
Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (1984); Richard H. Fallon, A Constructivist
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1989).
43
See e.g., Eric Segall, Originalism as Faith 105-12 (2018) (arguing that inclusive originalism
(described below) is indistinguishable from living constitutionalism); Steven D. Smith, “That Old
Time Originalism” in The Challenge of Originalism: Essays in Constitutional Theory (Grant
Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds.) (2011) (arguing that modern forms of originalism risk collapse
into living constitutionalism). For an argument that the more general tendency of rules to collapse
into standards leads to the convergence of constitutional theories, see Jeremy K. Kessler & David
E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure. A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev.
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for the discussion is the emergence of “inclusive originalism.” Originalists insist
on the binding force of original understanding. But what if that understanding itself
mandates resort to nonoriginalist methodology? The logic of originalism suggests
that some form of nonoriginalism should then be allowed to enter through the back
door. It turns out that some originalists have embraced this logic.44
The most obvious practical consequence of inclusive originalism is to command
respect for prior, nonoriginalist decisions. Many originalists agree that stare decisis
was built into the original understanding of judicial power.45 When a constitutional
question is entirely new, stare decisis doesn’t matter. But at this stage of our
history, these questions are few and far between. Most modern constitutional
controversies are ensnared in a complex mesh of prior decisions. Given that fact,
even originalists should hardly be surprised that most opinions in constitutional
cases are preoccupied with the meaning of prior, often nonoriginalist precedent and
say little or nothing about the meaning of the text itself.
The Supreme Court has frequently insisted that stare decisis is not an
“inexorable command.”46 Some originalists would sharply limit the force of the
doctrine, perhaps on originalist grounds.47 But it is far from clear that the original
understanding of stare decisis supports this position.48 Even if it did, the huge
number of important prior decisions that rest on nonoriginalist methodology means
that starting over would present a daunting task -- more of a revolution than a course
correction.49 For that reason, even originalist judges often turn their attention to
1819, 1870 (2016). See also TAN xx, infra (discussing the tendency of rules to collapse into
standards).
44
See, e.g., William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law? 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2349 (2015); William
Baude & Steven E. Sachs Grounding Originalism, 113 Nw. L. Rev. 1455, 1457 (2019). Cf. Steven
G. Calabresi & Todd W. Shaw, The Jurisprudence of Samuel Alito, 87 G. W. L. Rev. 507, 531-40
(2019) (identifying Justice Alito’s approach to constitutional law with inclusive originalism).
45
For originalist defenses of stare decisis, see John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the
Rules of Precedent, 50 Duke L. J. 503, 525-31 (2000); John O. McGinnes & Michael R. Rappaport,
Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 Nw. L. Rev. 803 (2009); William Baude, Is
Originalism Our Law? 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2349, 2360-61 (2015).
46
See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
47
See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case against Precedent, 17 Harv. J.L & Pub. Pol’y
23 (1993); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 Const.
Comm. 289 (2005).
48
See note xx, supra.
49
See Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint,
22 Const. Comm. 271,272 (2005) (noting that “[b]y some accounts, 80 percent of the justificatory
arguments in Supreme Court constitutional law opinions are grounded in precedent”). Cf. David
A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutionalism, 63 Chi. L. Rev. 877, 883 (1996) (“It is the rare
constitutional case in which the text plays any significant role. Mostly the courts decide cases by
looking to what the precedents say.”)
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the meaning of prior decisions rather than to the meaning of the constitutional
text.50
This is just the focus that living constitutionalists also favor.51 For them, as
well as for originalists, prior decisions are crucial, albeit for different reasons. For
living constitutionalists who favor the common law model, the gradual evolution
of judicial doctrine through elaboration on prior authority is what constitutionalism
is all about. They too are concerned about when prior precedent should be followed
and some of them, like their originalist rivals, would limit the force of stare
decisis.52 Moreover, many of the criteria they would use mirror the criteria favored
by originalists even if living constitutionalists do not derive the criteria from
original understanding.53 The upshot is a convergence of originalist and living
constitutionalist practice.

50

For a notable example, see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). The issue
before the Court was whether states were bound by the second amendment command concerning
the right to bear arms. Writing for the Court, Justice Alito analyzed prior precedent concerning the
incorporation of bill of rights protections under the due process clause fourteenth amendment. He
concluded that this precedent required inclusion of the second amendment among the incorporated
rights. See id. at 760-781. In so holding, the Court rejected an argument advanced by petitioner,
see id. at 758, and by Justice Thomas in a concurrence, see id. at 805-858 (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) that the Court should overrule its prior holding in the
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36, 74-83 (1872) and hold that the bill of rights applied
to the states because of the command of the fourteenth amendment’s privileges and immunities
clause. Justice Alito acknowledged that today “many legal scholars” agreed that the privileges and
immunities clause, rather than the due process clause, incorporated the bill of rights, id. at 757, but
concluded that “[f]or many decades, the question of the rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment against state infringement has been analyzed under the Due Process Clause of that
Amendment and not under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. We therefore decline to disturb
the Slaughter–House holding.” Id. at 758.
51
See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutionalism, note x, supra, at 883.
52
For a famous example, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (arguing
that the Court should not “turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even
to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its
full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”)
53
For a good example of the overlap between originalist and living constitutionalist criteria for
respecting precedent, compare Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 505 U.S.
833, 854 (1992) (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Suiter, JJ) (examining, among other factors,
workability, reliance, and compatibility of decision with other aspects of law in applying stare
decisis) with Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2265 (2022)
(examining, among other factors, workability, reliance, and effects on other areas of the law in
applying stare decisis). As these cases illustrate, however, the fact that originalist and living
constitutionalist judges use the same criteria provides no guarantee that they will reach the same
outcome.
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Inclusive originalism leads to other points of convergence as well. It has played
a crucial role in the diminished influence of earlier forms of originalism based on
original intent or original expected application.54 Early versions of originalism
focused on what the framers intended their words to mean55 and on how they
expected the words would be applied to specific controversies.56 At least some
modern originalists are ready to agree that, as an initial matter, interpretation of a
text should turn on the answers to these questions.57 But inclusive originalism once
again leads originalism to double back on itself. Inclusive originalists argue that
the intent of the framers was not to have the law determined by their intent. Instead,
their meta-intent was to make the “original public meaning” of the text
determinative.58
Oddly, then, respecting the Framers’ intent regarding
interpretation means not respecting their intent regarding outcomes. The Framers
themselves thought that what ought to govern was not private interpretations or
expectations, but the way in which the words were understood by ordinary readers
at the time the words were written.
Critics of originalism have advanced trenchant criticisms of this “original
public meaning” approach,59 but, for present purposes, what matters is how it again
produces a convergence with living constitutionalism. Once interpretation is freed
54

See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 Ford. L. Rev. 375,
386 (2013) (noting that “[o]riginalist theory has now largely coalesced around original public
meaning as the proper object of interpretive inquiry”); Lawrence B. Solum, Surprising Originalism:
The Regula Lecture, 9 ConLawNOW 235, 238-40 (2018) (rejecting original intention and expected
application forms of originalism).
55
See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.
J. 1, 13 (1971) (discussing “framers’ intent); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to Original Intentions in
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. L. Rev. 226 (1988)
(defending interpretation based on intent of framers); Edwin Meese III, The Supreme Court of the
United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 455, 465-66 (1986) (defending
a “jurisprudence or original intention.”)
56
See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, note x, supra, at 13 (“If the legislative history revealed a consensus
about segregated schooling . . . I don’t see how the Court could escape the choice revealed . . . even
though the words are general and conditions have changed.”)
57
See, e.g., Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why
Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 967 (2004).
58
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Surprising Originalism: The Regula Lecture, 9 ConLawNow
235, 240 (2018)(emphasis in original) (“Because the drafters of the constitutional text wrote for the
public, the meaning that they intended to convey was the public meaning-the original public meaning of the constitutional text.”) But cf. John O. McGinnis & Michael
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case against
Construction, 103 Nw. L. Rev. 751, 788 (2009) (concluding that “the interpretive rules that would
have been deemed applicable to the Constitution conformed to original meaning originalism,
original intent originalism, or something in between”).
59
See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2009).
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from the intent of the framers and the way in which they expected the language to
be applied, many of the Constitution’s capacious and Delphic commands become
ambiguous, vague, and open textured. They are “almost as enigmatic as the dreams
Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh,”60 in Justice Robert Jackson’s
famous formulation.
The problem is especially acute once the “original expected application”
approach is abandoned. At least in principle, historians might uncover whether the
framers of the fourteenth amendment or the general public expected the amendment
to outlaw segregated education or whether the generation that wrote and ratified the
first amendment thought that it permitted the regulation of obscenity. But if one
focuses instead on the general aims of the amendments and acknowledges the
possibility that the framing generation might be mistaken as to their application or
not envisioned the application in a modern context, then many legal outcomes
quickly become radically indeterminate.
There are two prominent solutions to this problem, both of which lead to
convergence between originalism and living constitutionalism. First, the very open
texture of phrases like “freedom of speech,” “equal protection,” “due process,”
“cruel and unusual punishment” and “the privileges and immunities of citizens”
might push toward an inclusive originalist understanding of the text. After all, more
specific language might have led to a public understanding that the clauses
produced only certain limited and predefined outcomes. Instead, the vaguer, more
open textured language might have produced a public understanding that the
meaning of the text would evolve over time to meet the needs of a changed
society.61 If that is so, then the original public meaning dictates the same outcome
favored by living constitutionalists.62
The second solution focuses on the distinction between interpretation and
construction, which has become a central preoccupation for many modern
originalists.63 Interpretation involves ascertainment of the semantic meaning of
text. Construction involves ascertainment of the text’s legal effect. When semantic
60

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring
in the judgment and the opinion of the Court).
61
See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Con. Comm. 291, 305 (2007) (“the
fact that adopters chose text that features general and abstract concepts is normally the best evidence
that they sought to embody general and abstract principles of constitutional law, whose scope, in
turn, will have to be fleshed out later on by later generations.”)
62
See generally id. (arguing that originalism supports the result in Roe v. Wade).
63
See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution 120-31 (2d ed. 2014); Keith
Wittington, Constitution Constructions: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning 3-9 (1999);
Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 Const. Comm. 95 (2010).
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meaning is clear, originalists insist, then there is no gap between interpretation and
construction. But sometimes meaning runs out. When interpretation fails to yield
an answer, then originalism cannot dictate legal effect, and some other technique
must be used.64
Originalists are divided about the size of this “construction zone” that exists
when meaning runs out and about the techniques that might be used to determine
legal effect when one is in the zone.65 If one rejects original intent and original
expected application as interpretive techniques then, for reasons explored above,
the zone might be very large. If one thinks that cases in the zone should be resolved
by resort to sources like tradition, public morality, common law methods, and
public policy, then the convergence between originalism and living
constitutionalism is virtually complete.
Of course, not all originalists think that the construction zone is large, or even
that it exists at all.66 And among originalists who recognize that the zone poses a
problem, there is disagreement about how cases within it should be resolved.67 This
point can be generalized. Debates among originalists on this and other matters
discussed in this section are ongoing and vigorous. Originalists have an obvious
motive to prove that their theory matters, and, unsurprisingly, they try to come up
with versions of the theory that do not produce complete convergence.68 The
upshot is that originalists have turned toward bickering among themselves. The
theory has begun to lose internal coherence even as it becomes more complex.69

64

See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, note x, supra, at 100-

108.
65

Compare, e.g., John O. McGuiness & Michael Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case against Construction, 103 Nw. L. Rev. 751 (2009) (the
construction zone does not exist) with Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional
Construction, 82 Ford. L. Rev. 453, 458 (2013) (the construction zone is “ineliminable”).
66
See, e.g., John O. McGuiness & Michael Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New
Theory of Interpretation and the Case against Construction, note x, supra (arguing that there is no
construction zone).
67
Compare, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation, Textual Meaning, Original
Intent, and Judicial Review 204-06 (1999) (arguing that cases in the construction zone should be
resolved by the political branches) with Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the
Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 Geo. L. J. 1 (2018) (arguing that cases in the
construction zone should be resolved by original spirit of constitutional text).
68
For some examples of originalist reaction to the threat of convergence, see Andrew Kopelman,
Why Jack Balkin Is Disgusting, 27 Const. Com. 177, 184 (2010).
69
See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 15 (2009) (“originalism is
not a single thesis but a large family of theses that encompasses even greater potential variability
than is generally appreciated.”)
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Because my intent is to provide only a thumb-nail sketch of the
originalism/living constitutionalist divide, I will not discuss this intramural
squabbling here. It is enough to see that, at least as the debate stands now, the
convergence problem has not gone away. Perhaps in the future, originalists will
coalesce around a version of their theory that is both widely accepted and
demonstrates that originalism makes a difference. But at least for the present,
versions of originalism are available that provide justification for virtually any
decision that would be reached by a living constitutionalist. Put differently, a living
constitutionalist could plausibly claim to be an originalist and give up nothing in
terms of actual results reached in cases. So long as that fact remains true, the
abstract debate between originalists and living constitutionalists has little
connection to actual constitutional practice.
B. Normative Claims
Suppose contrary to everything that I have said above, originalism and living
constitutionalism provide distinctive and important modes of constitutional
interpretation. That descriptive claim hardly matters unless one can offer
convincing normative arguments for the modes of interpretation. Why should one
be an originalist or a living constitutionalist? Demonstrating that a social practice
is coherent and distinctive is a necessary first step in the argument, but proponents
must also demonstrate that it is a desirable social practice, or at least more desirable
than alternative practices.70
On the normative level, living constitutionalists and originalists face challenges
that mirror each other. Many living constitutionalists try to discredit originalism
by pointing to the normatively unattractive results that would flow from adopting
originalist methodology. Originalism, they claim, would lead to officially
segregated public schools, second class citizenship for women, and sharply limited
free speech rights, among other things.71
70

Cf. Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1365, 1382 (1990) (arguing that
“the people are entitled to ask what the benefits to them of originalism would be” and that they will
“find no answers” in Robert Bork’s book, The Tempting of America.)
71
See, e.g, Congressional Record – Senate (at 18519 (July 1, 1987) (statement of Senator
Kennedy) (arguing that “Robert Bork’s America” would be a place where there were “back alley
abortions,” segregated lunch counters, police abuse, little access to federal courts, widespread
censorship, and school children unable to learn about evolution); Cass R. Sunstein, Of Snakes and
Butterflies: A Reply, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 2234, 2240 (exploring the possibility that originalism
“would permit race and sex discrimination by the national government; eliminate the right to
privacy; allow racial segregation at the state level; permit states to establish their own religions;
require abolition of the administrative state; or for that matter doom most Americans to short,
desperate, and miserable lives)”; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed through
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Some originalists have tried to counter these assertions with defensive
maneuvers—inventive and sometimes counterintuitive arguments supposedly
derived from the original understanding that support current doctrine concerning
matters like racial segregation72 and gender equality.73 These arguments tend to
push originalism toward the convergence with living constitutionalism described
above.
But originalists have available another response that might allow them to turn
the tables on living constitutionalists. The response is grounded in the distinction
between substantive and political justice. The problem, originalists might claim, is
that Americans are divided on questions of substantive justice and will remain
divided for the foreseeable future. The only hope for settling our disputes in
peaceful fashion is to forsake substantive justice for political justice – that is, for a
system that resolves our substantive disagreements in a fashion that is neutral and
fair and that the losers are therefore bound to accept even if their substantive
ambitions are thwarted.74
If this argument is right, then objections to originalism because it sometimes
produces substantively unjust outcomes unintentionally gives the game away.
Originalists might claim that these objections reveal living constitutionalism for
what it is – a cover for giving a constitutional imprimatur to a particular set of
predetermined substantive outcomes. In contrast, the fact that originalism
sometimes produces substantive outcomes that originalists oppose is a strength of
the theory.75 These departures demonstrate that originalism is truly neutral and
that it therefore should be acceptable to people with different views of substantive
justice.
This response, in turn, leads to two problems for originalists. First, it is far from
clear that many originalists are prepared to exhibit the kind of discipline that the
The Lens of Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. Rev. 1107, 1113 (2008) (noting that social
security and paper money might be unconstitutional if one used an originalist approach.).
72
See Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19 Harv.
J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 457 (1996);
73
See Steve G. Calabresi & Julia T. Richert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 Tex. L. Rev.
1 (2011).
74
For the standard defense of this position, see John Rawls, Political Liberalism (expanded ed.
2005). For a legal version of the same idea that predates Rawls, see Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M.
Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 4 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
75
Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Surprising Originalism: The Regula Lecture, 9 ConLawNow 235,
251-68 (2018) (arguing that originalism leads to many progressive outcomes).
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response requires. At least potentially, acceptance of the argument means
swallowing without complaint the most serious sorts of substantive injustice.76 The
very fact that many originalists attempt to slide off the implications of their theory
by confessing to faintness of heart77 or by adopting, shall we say, inventive versions
of the original understanding78 demonstrates that they are reluctant to accept the
full implications of their own approach.79
Suppose counterfactually that originalists were willing to go all in. The second
problem they face is explaining why they should. Granted, we need a method for
resolving our substantive disagreements. Why choose this method, which, after all,
binds us to judgments made exclusively by relatively wealthy white men hundreds
of years ago about a society radically different from our own? We might instead
opt to resolve disagreement by decisions made through unfettered democracy, by
wise modern statesmen (perhaps sitting on the Supreme Court), or, more fancifully,
by interpretation of the French Constitution or of the teachings of Jesus, Karl Marx,
Jeremy Bentham, or Oprah Winfrey.
If there were widespread acceptance of originalism as the exclusive method of
resolving our constitutional disputes, that fact alone might provide an argument for
the theory. Perhaps occasional instances of substantive injustice are worth the price
for a theory that, rightly or wrongly, all Americans or almost all Americans accept.
But the very existence of the argument between originalists and living
constitutionalists, the fact that Supreme Court justices regularly utilize
nonoriginalist methodology, and the vigorous disputes within each approach refute
the assertion that we have reached consensus concerning constitutional

76

See note x, supra.
See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Conn. L. Rev. 849, 864 (1989)
(confessing to being a “faint-hearted” originalist and stating that he would not vote to uphold
flogging as punishment even if this were the original meaning of the Constitution). Justice Scalia
seems to have subsequently repudiated this view. See Jennifer Senior, In Conversation:
Antonin Scalia, N.Y.
MAG.,
Oct.
6,
2013,
at
1, available
at http://
nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/.
78
See TAN xx, supra.
79
Cf. Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, note x, supra, at 1373 (criticizing Robert Bork for
“continually reassur[ing] the reader that originalism does not yield ghastly results, while at the same
time denouncing judges who are ‘result-oriented.’”)
77
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methodology.80 Instead of settling our disagreements, preoccupation with the
originalist/living constitutionalist debate merely refocuses them.81
Originalists have developed two, overlapping answers to this challenge, neither
of which is persuasive. First, they claim, originalism just is what it means to
interpret a text.82 Second, they claim, originalism just is our law.83
I confess to some doubt as to what these assertions are meant to establish. At
least two of the scholars who make them label their project as “positivist,”84 so
perhaps they are doing no more than describing our word usage without suggesting
any prescription that follows from that usage. If so, their work self-evidently does
nothing to aid the normative case for originalism, and discussion of it belongs in
the previous section.
I cannot escape the suspicion, though, that the claims are meant to take
advantage of the favorable reputations of “interpretation” and, especially of “the
rule of law” to drive readers to a normative conclusion.85 They seem to be
suggesting that because interpretation just is originalism and because originalism
just is our law, therefore we should be originalists.

80

See Richard H. Fallon, How To Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 535, 547-48
(arguing that “[a]s originalists candidly admit, originalist principles cannot explain or justify much
of contemporary constitutional law. Important lines of precedent diverge from original
understandings. Judges frequently take other considerations into account. Moreover, the public
generally accepts the courts' non-originalist pronouncements as legitimate --not merely as final, but
as properly rendered.”)
81
Cf. Charles L. Barzun, The Positive U-Turn, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 1323, 1355-60 (2017) (arguing
that pervasive disagreement about interpretive method refutes claim that originalism is “our law.”)
82
See, e.g., Lino Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 Stan. L. Rev.
1019, 1024 (1992) (emphasis in original) (“An entirely sufficient reason for originalism, is that
interpreting a document means to attempt to discern the intent of the author; there is no other
‘interpretive methodology’ properly so called”).
83
See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2349 (2015); Stephen E.
Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 Harv. J. L. Pub. Pol’y 817(2015); William
Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1455 (2017).
84
See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, note x, supra, at 1463
(characterizing their project as examining what our practices are).
85
For example, Professor Sachs writes that “To be a nonoriginalist, on this Article's view, is to
say of some new rule: “Maybe Rule X wasn't lawfully adopted; maybe it can't be defended under
preexisting law; but I'm okay with that, and so is America.” Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a
Theory of Legal Change, note x, supra. at 822. It seems pretty clear that Professor Sachs is not
“okay with that” and he doesn’t think that America is either.
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If my suspicions are correct, then these advocates have fallen into the trap of
relying on what H.L.A. Hart once called “definitional stops.”86 They attempt to
resolve normative disagreement by what amounts to an undefended command
embodied in a definition.
There are two ways to see the problem with this effort, both of which end up in
the same place. First, one might attack the definitions themselves. Neither “law”
nor “interpretation” is a natural kind like chemical elements or biological species.
Because law and interpretation are not natural kinds, defining is different from
discovering. Definitions of these socially constructed artifacts are stipulative and
determine the boundaries of the practices. If the definitions lead to undesirable
social practices, then why not just change them? 87
Second, if we leave the definitions fixed, we can decouple them from the
normative conclusions said to flow from them. H.L.A. Hart himself endorsed this
position regarding his definition of “law.”88 He insisted that his formulation
captured what the social practice consisted of, but he maintained that his definition
provided no external reason for people to feel bound to obey the law. The same
point can be made about “interpretation.” If interpretation “just is” the recovery of
original semantic meaning, then so much the worse for interpretation. If
“interpretation” of the Constitution leads to evil outcomes, then we should abandon
the practice or apply it to a different text.
In summary, both living constitutionalism and originalism leave crucial
normative questions unresolved. Living constitutionalists must respond to the
charge that their theory is gerrymandered to lead to the “right” substantive
outcomes. Originalists must explain why we should accept their approach to
political justice when it leads to the “wrong” substantive outcomes. Adherents of
both theories try to sidestep these problems by arguing that the theories don’t
require these outcomes after all. But the very effort to demonstrate that fact pushes
them into the trap of descriptive convergence.
All of which leads to an obvious question: Can we do better? The next Part
responds to this challenge.
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III. REMAPPING CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
In this part, I examine how our constitutional disputes would look if we
remapped them along the lines that I have suggested above. I have organized the
discussion by examining separately the assertions and problematics associated with
the rival forms of activism and restraint. To be clear, my claim is not that any of
the approaches avoids contradiction and incoherence. Those problems come with
the territory that I map, and readers so inclined might choose to focus on them. Nor
do I intend to take sides in the disputes among advocates of the different
approaches. Instead, my claim is that these approaches respond to all three, and not
just one, of the questions a constitutional theory must answer, that they better
describe the concerns of actual practitioners of constitutional law, and that they
better reveal what is really at stake in our constitutional disputes.
A. Libertarian Activism
Libertarian activism captures constitutional law’s standard story. According to
that story, Supreme Court decisions enforcing constitutional rights protect against
an overweening government that threatens private liberty and property.89 Decisions
defending property rights,90 freedom of contract,91 free speech92 and religion
rights,93 the rights of minorities,94 the rights to reproductive freedom95 and family
formation,96 procedural due process rights,97 the right to bear arms,98 and rights
associated with criminal prosecution like the privilege against self-incrimination,99
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protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,100 and the right to counsel101
all fit under this rubric. On at least some accounts, judicially enforced principles
of federalism102 and separation of powers103 are also rooted in libertarian activism.
The standard story is in some tension with the motives of the original Framers,
who wanted to strengthen the power of the federal government.104 Still, at least
some of the decisions find support in the text of the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth
amendment. They also comport with some versions of the “evolving standards”105
favored by living constitutionalists.
Importantly, however, neither originalism nor living constitutionalism fully
supports libertarian activism. Many rights that libertarian activists want to
protected – for example, the rights to unconventional family formation,106 to
protection against regulatory takings,107 to first amendment protection for money
spent on political speech,108 and to reproductive freedom109 -- are not grounded in
the original understanding, at least in any obvious way. Their existence would have
come as a surprise to the drafting generation. For these reasons, libertarian support
100
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for them is in some tension with originalist methodology.110 At least some of the
rights also pose a problem for living constitutionalists, who claim, for example, that
some gun rights and property rights are inconsistent with the needs of modern
America.111
Instead of flowing from a particular interpretive technique, libertarian activism
embodies a widely held political theory. That theory emphasizes the pre-political
nature of individual rights, the obligation of the government to protect them, and
the risk of unconstrained government power.112 As the existence of unenumerated
rights demonstrates, these concerns are free standing; they might be, but need not
be, tied to a particular constitutional text or to a particular interpretive technique.
For this reason, libertarian activism skirts the normative problems with
originalism and living constitutionalism. Because both originalism and living
constitutionalism purport to be substantively neutral, advocates for them must
convince skeptics that their theories should be accepted even when they produce
“bad” outcomes. Libertarian activists avoid this problem because they are prepared
to engage in normative discussion on the merits. The best argument for libertarian
activism is not that the approach is “neutral” as between various political theories.
Instead, the approach stands or falls on the persuasiveness of substantive, libertarian
political theory, and libertarians therefore stand ready to offer a defense for that
theory. Their approach therefore directs our attention to where it belongs: on the
attractiveness of libertarian theory more generally.
In this way, libertarian activism responds to not just the first, but also the second
and third questions a constitutional theory should answer. Who should have
interpretive authority when people reasonably disagree about constitutional
meaning? The branch that is most likely to protect rights in a private sphere.
Libertarian activists believe that that branch is the judiciary because courts are less
subject to majoritarian constraint and, therefore, less likely to hold private rights
hostage to public pressure.113 But once again, libertarian activism stands or falls
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on the persuasiveness of this claim. If courts are not the best guarantors of rights
in a private sphere, then libertarian activism fails on its own terms.
Once constitutional meaning is ascertained, should it be binding on us? Yes,
libertarian activists claim, because, correctly understood, the Constitution
embodies libertarian principles, and libertarian activists are prepared to defend
those principles on the merits.114
Of course, this answer brackets the question of how constitutional meaning is
to be ascertained. But libertarian activists have a candid, substantive response to
this problem as well: Meaning should be ascertained by the method most likely to
make the Constitution worthy of obedience – that is by the method that is most
protective of a private sphere. Some libertarian activists believe that originalism
provides such a method,115 while others put their faith in living constitutionalism.116
But this disagreement is about empirics rather than fundamental principle.
Libertarian activists are united in thinking that the choice between interpretive
methodologies should be made instrumentally to advance the cause of
libertarianism.
At first, it might seem that the most powerful challenge to libertarian activism
comes from the two versions of restraint – deferential and anti-discretionary. In the
sections below discussing these forms of restraint, I suggest some reasons why the
argument for restraint might indeed threaten libertarian activism.117 But for present
purposes, it is important to see that the relationship between libertarian activism
and restraint is complex and that there are methods for resolving the most obvious
tensions between them.
1. Libertarian activism and deferentialism. Consider, first, the argument from
deferential restraint. The argument is captured in Chief Justice Roberts’ accusatory
question offered in response to the Supreme Court’s libertarian activism in defense

because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming victims of
prejudice and public excitement.”)
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of gay marriage: “Just who do we think we are?”118 That question implicitly
invokes doubt about the special wisdom or knowledge of Supreme Court justices.
It is similarly captured by Justice Scalia’s response to the libertarian activist
assertion of a right to die: “the point at which life becomes ‘worthless,’ and the
point at which the means necessary to preserve it become ‘extraordinary’ or
‘inappropriate,’ are neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine
Justices of this Court any better than they are known to nine people picked at
random from the Kansas City telephone directory.”119
This criticism misunderstands the argument advanced by libertarian activists.
The criticism would be valid if libertarian activists claimed that judges should
decide whether gay marriage is desirable or when a life is no longer worth living.
If that were true, then skepticism about the wisdom of judges would have bite. But
in fact, the whole point of libertarian activism is to resist collective judgments of
this kind, whether by the judiciary or by the political branches. Instead, libertarian
activists insist that these matters should be left to individuals to decide.
When the Supreme Court upholds a religious liberty claim advanced by, say,
an orthodox Jew, it is not asserting that orthodox Judaism is the “correct” religion.
Instead, it leaves the matter to private choice. Similarly, a court that upheld a right
to gay marriage or to determine the timing of one’s own death does not establish
official government policy regarding the wisdom of these decisions. Instead, it
leaves them to people “picked at random from [a] telephone directory,” albeit in
their individual, rather than collective capacities.
It turns out, then, that there is a way to align libertarian activism with deferential
restraint. Individual choice is appropriate precisely because courts, like the rest of
government, have no special knowledge about, say, marriage or death. Because
they have no special knowledge, they should defer to individual judgments on these
subjects.
2. Libertarian activism and anti-discretionism. What about the argument of
anti-discretionists? Critics of libertarian activism frequently complain that the
justices are engaged in ad hocery and making up rights with no grounding beyond
their personal preferences.120 Judges, they insist, should be restrained in the sense
118
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that they should be able to point to an external and uncontroversial source for their
decisions.
Assuming arguendo that this form of restraint is attractive, it does not follow
that it necessarily defeats the claims of libertarian activists. On the contrary, an
unwillingness to use improper discretion can force a reluctant judge into activism.
Consider in this regard Justice Kennedy’s pained concurrence in Texas v.
Johnson,121 a case where the Court invalidated on free speech grounds a Texas
statute that prohibited flag desecration. Kennedy thought that the flag encapsulated
“beliefs Americans share, beliefs in law and peace and that freedom which sustains
the human spirit.”122 He acknowledged that he was deciding the case in a way that
he “[did] not like.”123 But, he insisted, anti-discretionism required libertarian
activism. “[W]hether or not [Johnson] could appreciate the enormity of the offense
he gave, the fact remains that his acts were speech, in both the technical and the
fundamental meaning of the Constitution. So I agree with the Court that he must go
free.”124
The anti-discretionist argument against activism is further weakened by the
implicit assumption that judicial power can be constrained only by the Constitution,
often understood according to an originalist framework. But if one’s true concern
is with judicial power, then there is no reason why limitations on that power need
come from constitutional text. In fact, most Supreme Court opinions say little or
nothing about text,125 but they are nonetheless lengthy efforts to demonstrate that
the outcome was dictated by some source of authority apart from the justices’
personal preferences.
What else might limit judicial discretion? Precedent, political forces, current
norms, international practice, the constellation of economic and social forces, and
a variety of philosophical systems can also constrain judges. Even when none of
these sources of authority is available, judges constrain themselves by announcing
sometimes arbitrary rules that bind them in the future.
Constitutional law is full of such rules, which often constrain judges far more
than mere reliance on text would. For example, state legislative districting is
Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern
themselves”).
121
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presumptively constitutional if the maximum deviation between districts is under
10%.126 Content regulation of speech is strictly scrutinized.127 An invocation of
Miranda rights wears off if the person has been freed from custody for fourteen
days.128 An arrestee can presumptively be held without a probable cause hearing
for no more than forty-eight hours.129
Many of these rules were created by justices who present themselves as
originalists. Most prominently, Justice Scalia certainly advertised himself as an
originalist, but he also authored a famous article entitled “The Rule of Law as the
Law of Rules.”130 He seems not to have noticed that there is a tension between
these two commitments. When original text is open textured, nonoriginalist rules
may be exactly what is needed to constrain judicial discretion. These rules might
prohibit libertarian activism, but they also might require judicial intervention to
protect a private sphere. When we are in the latter situation, anti-discretionism
supports rather than forbids libertarian activism.
For these reasons, neither deferential nor anti-discretionist restraint fully refute
the case for libertarian activism. A more serious challenge comes from the rival
form of activism that argues for government intervention.
B. Interventionist Activism
If libertarian activism is the constitutional law’s standard story, then
interventionist activism is its sometimes muted but nonetheless persistent and
occasionally dominant counternarrative. Interventionist activists insist that the
most serious threat to liberty comes not from government, but from private choices
in markets and elsewhere and the combination of empowerment and
disempowerment that those choices produce. On their view, government
intervention is necessary to discipline these outcomes.
Standing alone, this claim is a central tenet of the modern American liberal
tradition.131 But interventionist activists make an additional assertion that has
sometimes put them on the fringe of political debates. They insist that the political
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branches are insufficiently attentive to the risk of private power and that those
branches must be goaded or forced into action by an active judiciary.
The first assertion is rooted in classical republican thought that associates
freedom with collective self-rule and public engagement.132 It has found expression
in, for example, Jacksonian and populist efforts to disempowers private elites,
progressive attacks on “the trusts,” New Deal redistributive measures, and the Great
Society’s assault on poverty.
For much of our history, advocates for these positions have favored judicial
restraint rather than activism. Andrew Jackson’s confrontations with John Marshall
are legendary.133 Attacks on the judiciary were a central feature of Theodore
Roosevelt’s fabled “bull moose” campaign for the presidency in 1912, 134 and a
quarter century later, his cousin, Franklin Roosevelt, frontally assaulted judicial
power to protect the New Deal.135
With the advent of the Warren Court, however, supporters of the first assertion
began to exhibit growing attraction to the second assertion. Indeed, for many
liberals, the belief that courts have a vital role to play in forcing the political
branches to confront private power became something like conventional wisdom.136
The change was accompanied by a dramatic shift in the political theory that had
supported the left wing’s program for generations. As noted above,137 historically,
the democratic left embraced a version of the republican tradition that emphasized
the possibilities of public mobilization by an aroused citizenry motivated by the
common good. For classical republicans, human flourishing was not produced by
the isolated, individual freedom prized by libertarians or by elite, paternalist
intervention that left ordinary citizens as mere spectators. Instead, citizens,
132
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themselves, had to engage in political action that transcended their narrow self
interest and overcame the twin evils of faction and selfishness. 138
For the new activists who favored judicial intervention, this republican vision
was overly romantic. They were not necessarily opponents of popular mobilization,
but they doubted that mobilization alone could overcome all the obstacles to
political change. They favored a supposedly more realistic, pluralist model of
politics that emphasized political malfunction. At first, this critique was focused
on the need for judicial protection of minority rights. Carolene Products famous
footnote 4,139 as extensively elaborated by John Hart Ely,140 provided reasons why
the political branches were unlikely to protect “discrete and insular minorities”
from oppression.
Standing alone, Ely’s version of pluralism supported only interstitial judicial
intervention in cases where ordinary pluralist protections for minorities broke
down. In the more usual case, Ely thought, political processes were good enough,
and the case for judicial intervention was much weaker.141 But the emergence of
public choice theory raised serious doubts about this relatively sanguine view.
Public choice theorists demonstrated that interest groups regularly thwarted
majority will.142 Indeed, on some versions of the theory, the very concept of
democracy and majority will amount to misleading myths.143
For many public choice theorists, the inevitable corruption of the political
branches suggested the desirability of limiting their power – that is the desirability
of libertarian activism.144 But some progressives used public choice insights to
138
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support the opposite conclusion. On their view, legislative subservience to private
interests meant that judges should do more to force government intervention.145
Like its rival, libertarian activism, interventionism does not purport to be
“neutral” as between various political theories. It, too, adopts a substantive theory
about what forces threaten human freedom and promote human flourishing. To
accept the theory, one must believe that collective intervention (at least of the right
sort) promotes liberty and that judges, guided by some version of constitutional
law, are more likely than politicians to promote the right sort of collective
intervention. This focus means that interventionists, like libertarians, have
responses to all three questions that a theory of constitutional law must answer.
Like their libertarian rivals, they believe that the Constitution should be interpreted
to require judicial activism, that judges are likely to so interpret the Constitution to
support the right sort of activism, and that, as so interpreted, the Constitution should
be obeyed because it is substantively just. Those assertions are doubtless
controversial, but that fact only means that debate about interventionist activism
will focus on the right questions.
Assuming arguendo that activist interventionism is attractive, how might
constitutional doctrine be reformulated to accomplish its ends? One approach
abandons or sharply limits the “state action” doctrine, which has long been at the
core of liberal constitutional thought. The state action requirement holds that
virtually all the Constitution’s commands constrain only the government and that,
correlatively, the Constitution leaves private actors free to act in contravention of
what otherwise would be constitutional values.146 For example, on this view the
Constitution does not prevent private employers from making racially
discriminatory hiring decisions or media outlets from “censoring” speakers with a
particular point of view.
Standing alone, the doctrine counsels deferentialist restraint. It leaves
interventionist policies in a politically discretionary zone: Courts cannot use
constitutional law to countermand private choices, but the political branches are
nonetheless free to intervene if they chose to do so. Libertarian activists take the
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argument one step further. They favored moving intervention into a prohibited
zone where courts prevent the political branches from acting.147
Seizing on internal weaknesses of the state action doctrine, interventionist
activists turn these understandings on their head by insisting that some forms of
intervention are in a constitutionally mandatory zone.148 They argue that
constitutional norms – especially those protecting equality and speech rights –
provide protection against, as well as protection for, private actors. That protection,
in turn, entails a constitutionally-rooted government obligation to intervene to
control those actors when they threatened constitutional values.149
Shelley v. Kramer150 illustrates how interventionist activists were able to
operationalize this theory. At issue were covenants entered by private parties that
prevented racial and religious minorities from purchasing real estate.151 On the
conventional view, the Constitution did not speak to these arrangements because
the government had merely failed to act. Perhaps the government had the power to
prohibit these covenants (although some libertarian activists would deny even
that152), but it was under no constitutional obligation to do so. The conventional
view thus coheres with the traditional progressive opposition to judicial activism
and insistence on democratic engagement as the best method for protecting
constitutional rights.
Shelley rejected this understanding. According to the Shelley Court, the
government was far from a passive bystander when restrictive covenants trapped
minorities in segregated communities. Courts stood ready to enforce these
“private” contracts, and that enforcement was coercive government action that the
Constitution prohibited.153
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In Shelley itself, the Court stopped short of holding that the government was
constitutionally obligated to intervene by outlawing “private” discrimination. It
was sufficient for the government not to enforce the discrimination.154 But in other
cases, the Court made clear that when the state lent support of private individuals,
the government was required to intervene to prevent those individuals from
engaging in discrimination.155 In these situations, “private” discrimination was in
the mandatory zone, where government action to protect minorities was
constitutionally compelled.
During the mid-twentieth century, the justices sporadically used Shelley-like
reasoning to support interventionist activism.156 Ultimately, though, the approach
was damaged by the failure to develop principles that limited its reach. All private
arrangements ultimately depend on the willingness of government to enforce the
property and contract rights that support them. Taken to the limits of its logic,
Shelley meant that there simply was no private sphere.157
In the hands of radical interventionists, this insight provided a cudgel to be
employed against libertarianism. At its core, libertarianism rested on a false
dichotomy between public and private. Because all supposedly private conduct
was ultimately dependent on public power, the libertarian position was
incoherent.158
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But as analytically powerful as this argument was, it proved too much to
swallow for people unwilling to give up on the idea of a private sphere. The
argument had particularly unsettling implications for advocates of judicial restraint.
The approach invested judges with enormous power to control the private sphere.
Judges might impose constitutional restrictions on whom one married, what
newspapers printed, who owned what material goods, and what religion one
professed.159 The unwillingness of even the most fervent interventionist activists
to support those conclusions meant that Shelley had to be limited. The failure to
find limits threatened to discredit the entire enterprise.160
Shelley’s weakness did not mean that there were no other strategies to
accomplish the goals of interventionist activism, however. The equal protection
clause as well as equality requirements that the Court read into the first
amendment161 provide a method by which judges can encourage political action
while avoiding a frontal assault on traditional state action principles. Even if the
Constitution does not directly mandate government intervention, the equality
requirement means that if the government protects some people from private
oppression, it must provide similar protection for other, similarly situated
individuals.
An equality approach provides a milder and more acceptable prod toward
interventionism than a frontal assault on the state action requirement. Instead of
facing a command, the political branches are offered a choice. In theory, they can
respond by withdrawing the protection for the favored class – that is by being less
active. In practice, however, this response will often seem impractical or
undesirable. As Carson162 illustrates, the requirement therefore puts pressure on
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government to provide protection for the disfavored class – that is, to intervene in
the private sphere more rather than less.
The Warren Court seized on the equality strategy to force government
intervention in a range of cases. Most famously, it used the strategy to dismantle
segregated schools and, so, to force the political branches to confront the systematic
oppression of African Americans.163 The strategy also enabled the use of judicial
power to require some government protection for the poor164 and for other
vulnerable groups like noncitizens,165 nonmarital children,166 and, in later years, for
women,167 and the LBGTQ community.168
The equality argument, like the attack on state action, has a problem with limits.
In principle, it is always possible to find one group treated more favorably than
another group and to therefore insist that the Constitution required government
intervention to aid the disfavored group. However, the Court was more successful
in developing a constitutional architecture to limit equality-based judicial
interventionism. Tiers of scrutiny based upon the status of the disadvantaged
group169 and the importance of the interest at stake170 served to limit the force of
the equality argument and preserve a broad sphere governed by political discretion.
When conservative opponents of redistribution gained control of the Supreme
Court, they used this architecture to limit sharply equality based judicial
interventionism. Conservative justices refused to expand the list of suspect
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classes171 and more or less ended heightened scrutiny for classifications related to
fundamental rights.172
It turns out, though, that conservative efforts to tame interventionist activism
may have been too hasty. Interventionist activism need not always have a leftist
tilt. For example, as discussed above,173 in recent years, conservative justices have
begun to use equality arguments to mandate government intervention designed to
assist religious groups. The conservative attack on affirmative action provides
another, albeit more complicated example. Strict scrutiny for government measures
mandating racial “preferences” is libertarian in the sense that it limits government
power.174 But the Court has read this constitutional requirement into the
antidiscrimination statute that governs use of affirmative action by private entities
receiving government funding.175 The result is a constitutionally inflected effort to
rescue supposedly disadvantaged whites from harm by private actors.
The prospect of further conservative interventionism is just over the horizon.
For example, it is easy to imagine a conservative court extending the reach of
Carson to hold that the free exercise clause prohibits state support of public, secular
education without comparable support for private, sectarian education. The result
would be a large scale, constitutionally mandated government intervention in the
market for private education.
Abortion opponents also seem poised to use Warren-style equality arguments
to support their cause. Until recently, abortion was in the constitutionally
mandatory zone, shielded from government control by a libertarian activist reading
of the Constitution.176 Overruling Roe v. Wade did no more than place abortion in
171
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a politically discretionary zone where the political branches could, but need not,
regulate the procedure.177 Some opponents of abortion argue that this outcome does
not go far enough and have developed equality arguments to put abortion in the
constitutionally prohibited zone. True, there is no “state action” when women on
their own secure abortions, but when the state permits the “killing” of fetuses but
prohibits the killing of children, it violates the equality rights of fetuses. On this
theory, the government could in theory resolve the equality problem by
withdrawing protection from children, but it would certainly instead solve the
problem by granting protection for fetuses.178 The more moderate version of this
argument uses it as a constitutional basis for a federal statute, justified by section 5
of the fourteenth amendment, that would impose a nation-wide ban on abortion.179
The more radical version insists that the equality requirement should be enforced
by judges, thereby outlawing abortion by judicial fiat.180
There are also conservative arguments for attacks on state action limitations.
The Shelley Court insisted that seemingly private contracts discriminating against
African Americans were ultimately dependent on state enforcement. Conservatives
might seize on this insight to support their own goals. Just because contract and
property rights depend upon state enforcement, therefore constitutional protection
for these rights entail judicially mandated government intervention when they are
violated. It might follow from this argument that the state’s toleration of, say,
private trespass on property or private refusal to abide by contract terms violates
the Constitution.
Consider, for example, Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, where the Court held
that a California regulation that granted labor organizers access to agricultural
property to solicit union membership violated the takings clause.181 The plaintiffs
sought declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of the regulation
against them,182, and the Court held that they were entitled to this relief. 183 As a
formal matter, therefore, the decision took the form of libertarian activism. It
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prohibited government regulation in the form of a mandate requiring the plaintiffs
to provide access to their property.
But the holding would be meaningless if it allowed California merely to repeal
the regulation but nonetheless to refuse to enforce its trespass laws against labor
organizers. The refusal would produce the same result that the Court declared
unconstitutional, albeit by means of nonenforcement without the formality of a
regulation. It follows that if one looks behind the formalities, the Court in effect
required government action to protect property rights. The result is a mirror
reflection of Shelly v. Kramer: Because private rights depend on state enforcement,
therefore the Constitution mandates government intervention to protect those
rights.
The logic of this argument might switch large swaths of constitutional law from
the permissive to the mandatory category in a way that advances the conservative
agenda. Consider, for example, conservative opposition to liberal criminal justice
reforms. Liberals have long associated themselves with the libertarian activist view
that the fourth and fifth amendment require these reforms.184 Until now,
conservatives have been satisfied with responding that the reforms are
discretionary.185 But the logic Cedar Point Nursery suggests that the reforms might
actually be constitutionally prohibited. On this theory, the exclusionary rule or
limitations on stop and frisk or on no-knock warrants embolden criminals, thereby
making the people less secure in their “persons, houses, papers, and effects” and
violating the government’s constitutional obligations.
It is at least possible, then, that we are on the threshold of a renaissance of
interventionist activism, but this time in support of conservative, rather than
progressive values. The success of these efforts will turn in part on whether
interventionists can overcome the objections of advocates of two versions of
judicial restraint, a subject to which we now turn.
C. Anti-Discretionist Restraint
Anti-discretionists favor restraint in the sense of limits on judicial choice. Their
concern about the political independence of judges leads them to worry about ad
hoc, case-by-case decision making that might be influenced by illegitimate

184

See, e.g., Paul Butler, Chokehold: Policing Black Men (2017).
See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Pub. Serv., 480 U.S. 189 (1989) (Rehnquist,
C.J.) (holding that the fourteenth amendment is not implicated by state failure to respond to private
violence).
185

REMAPPING CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 43

prejudice, value judgments or ideological preferences. They argue for rules, set out
in advance, that constrain this sort of activism.
One might respond to these concerns by claiming that anti-discretionists are
attacking a straw man. No one defends random or entirely arbitrary decision
making. Judges who utilize an “all things considered” standard, applied in casespecific fashion, are nonetheless using some sort of implicit metric to guide their
decisions.186
Suppose, though, that we accept at least provisionally the anti-discretionist
argument that different decision mechanisms produce different degrees of
constraint and that we should choose the mechanisms that keep judicial power in
check. Even if one accepts this premise, it turns out that anti-discretionist constraint
is not always inconsistent with either libertarian or interventionist activism. On the
contrary, and paradoxically, sometimes anti-discretionist restraint requires
activism.
Compare, for example, the positions of Justices Black and Frankfurter
regarding the incorporation controversy that preoccupied constitutional scholars
several generations ago.187 Frankfurter was a deferentialist, but he was relatively
unconcerned about abuse of judicial discretion. That combination led him to
oppose libertarian activism in the form of applying Bill of Rights criminal justice
protections on the state level. In contrast, at least in this context, Black’s strong
commitment to anti-discretionist restraint and lack of concern about deferentialism
led him to endorse libertarian activism.
Both Frankfurter and Black were influenced by their recent experience with the
libertarian activism of the Lochner era that ultimately threatened New Deal
legislation. Frankfurter emerged from the experience as a deferentialist. No doubt
channeling his experience as a progressive reformer who helped formulate the New
Deal,188 he worried that a reading of the fourteenth amendment’s due process
clause that saddled local governments with the rigid prohibitions of the Bill of
Rights would “deprive the States of opportunity for reforms in legal process.”189
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It did not follow that the states were entirely unconstrained. The Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited them from “offend[ing] those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples.”190
Frankfurter was unbothered by the discretion that these vague canons gave to
judges. For him, it did not matter that “[t]hese standards of justice are not
authoritatively formulated anywhere as though they were prescriptions in a
pharmacopoeia.”191 Moreover, when interpreted with a deferentialist sensibility,
these unenumerated standards were usually elastic enough to leave states free to
depart from the norms that the Bill of Rights required for the federal government.192
Frankfurter thus discounted arguments against judicial discretion and used that
discretion to embrace judicial deference.
Black learned a very different lesson from the Lochner experience. He thought
that Lochner-era judges were disastrously wrong to impose their own views on the
rest of the country. This led him to rail against the proposition that the Supreme
Court was “endowed by the Constitution with boundless power under ‘natural law’
periodically to expand and contract constitutional standards to conform to the
Court's conception of what at a particular time constitutes ‘civilized decency’ and
‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice.’”193 He therefore favored rules
embedded in constitutional text to constrain judicial discretion.194 But at least in
this context, Black’s anti-discretionism led him to judicial activism. He thought
that a fair reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s text left him no choice but to
invalidate state measures that violated the Bill of Rights.195
For Black, anti-discretionism was closely tied to originalism. His support for
incorporation was grounded in his careful reading of the fourteenth amendment’s
text and history.196 But, pace Black, there is in fact no necessary connection
between anti-discretionism and originalism.
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All anti-discretionists share Justice Black’s worry about judicial power.
Because the judicial branch is insulated from political control, they are concerned
with the special risk that judges will exercise that power arbitrarily or in pursuit of
an idiosyncratic program that departs from the aims of most Americans. Judges
therefore need to be constrained by rules that are independent of judicial desires,
whims, and political preferences.
But Black failed to see that these rules might be derived from a variety of
sources. True, judges can bind themselves to obey constitutional text, but they can
also bind themselves to a variety of other systems of thought.
This possibility leads to the second reason why judicial activists might have
little to fear from anti-discretionists. True, the rules that bind judges might prevent
them from countermanding judicial decisions, but they might also require judges to
act. It all depends on which rules constrain judges, and anti-discretionism alone
does not specify which rules those are. As Black’s libertarianism demonstrated,
anti-discretionism threatens judicial activism only if the binding rules inhibit, rather
than mandate use of judicial power.
Does it follow that anti-discretionism poses no threat to activism? It turns out
that this conclusion is too simple. Things become more complicated if one focuses
on meta-questions about judicial discretion concerning the choice among rules and
on the way in which the chosen rules are administered.
One part of the difficulty results from our pluralist constitutional practice.
Contemporary American judges have a broad menu of different rule-based systems
to choose from.197 Our practices permit them to resort to text, tradition,
contemporary moral standards, administrability or public policy requirements, and
more. Each of these rule systems might constrain judicial discretion, but because
the norm requiring consistency among rule-based systems is weak, judges are free
to select the system that leads to the right result in the case before them. Judges
can “look[ ] out over a crowd and pick[ ] out your friends,” as Chief Justice Roberts
observed in another context.198 Put differently, even if the rules themselves limit
judicial discretion, anti-discretionists still worry about judicial discretion in
choosing among rules.
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Suppose that we somehow changed our practice so that judges were required to
pick a rule-based system and stick with it. The requirement might help solve the
problem of case-specific discretion, but that is not the only difficulty. As Robert
Bork famously insisted, “neutral principles” requires not just neutrality of
application but also neutrality of derivation.199 Perhaps a particular system of rules
does not unfailingly yield the right result in every case, but anti-discretionists worry
about judicial discretion to choose a system of rules based on whether the system
yields the desired result more often than another system.
In addition to these difficulties, there are two problems with the administration
of rules. First, rules at least arguably limit judicial discretion, but they also result
in case-specific injustice. Rules only matter when they produce a result different
from the result a judge would reach using a particularistic all-things-considered
approach. But it is in just these cases where rules matter that they are also most
problematic. It is precisely when they require departure from what we would
otherwise do that they seem formalistic and unjust.200
This problem is captured by the insight advanced by some philosophers that
rule utilitarianism inevitably collapses into act utilitarianism. If a rule yields a
“bad” outcome in a particular case, judges always have the option of substituting a
narrower rule or adding an exception to the rule that produces the “right” result in
the case before them. If this process is reiterated often enough, it ultimately leads
to a rule that simply requires choosing the “right” action on the particular facts
before the judge.201
This argument is of more than philosophical interest. It explains why legal rules
get more complicated over time and why they often fail to constrain judges. In a
mature legal system, the proliferation of subrules, exceptions to rules, and glosses
placed on rules end up giving judges considerable discretion.202
199
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Suppose, counterfactually, that we had judges who had the discipline to
swallow case-specific injustice and stick with the formal rigidity of the initial rule.
A second well-known problem is that even seemingly rigid rules do not always
dictate outcomes in specific cases.
The point can be, and often has been, overstated. Given background facts about
language and the distribution of cultural, economic, and political power, some
interpretations of rules will be off the table.203 No, the Constitution does not permit
24-year-old presidents or create three Houses of Congress. But many rules are open
to interpretation, especially when, over time, they are applied to unanticipated facts.
Is an AK-47 within the definition of “arms” protected by the Second Amendment?
Are computer programs “speech” that the First Amendment tells us cannot be
abridged? Even a judge ready to stick with an initial rule will have considerable
discretion in interpreting this language.
Moreover, rule-makers are not unaware of the risk that rules will lead to
injustice. Because they are aware of this risk, and because they often must
compromise by writing language that satisfies everyone, they create rules that are
open textured. These rules avoid forcing “wrong” results that would put pressure
on rule-following, but they do so by enhancing judicial discretion. The Framers
of the Bill of Rights therefore prohibited searches and seizures that are
“unreasonable”204 and protected “other” unenumerated rights “retained by the
people.”205 Provisions like these may be necessary to avoid mindless formalism,
but they also open possibilities for the kind of idiosyncratic judicial choice that antidiscretionists fear.
If all this is correct, then anti-discretionism gives judicial activists quite a lot to
worry about. Indeed, the anti-discretionist critique of activism goes beyond what
even many anti-discretionists themselves imagine. The critique suggests not just
that judges should follow the rules, but that no system of rules can adequately
constrain judges. The choice among rules, the inevitable degradation of rule-like
structures, and the indeterminacy of rules all work together to permit too much
judicial discretion. If the problem of discretion is indeed unsolvable, then all
judicial activism becomes problematic.
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However, there is a final turn to the argument. Anti-discretionism makes
judicial activism problematic only if we think that judges will use their discretion
unwisely or unjustly. Do we? Answering that question turns on empirical issues
about who is likely to become a judge, normative issues about what constitutes
wisdom and justice, and political theory issues about how we should resolve
disagreements about wisdom and justice. In that way, anti-discretionism leads us
away from tired questions about interpretive method and toward the questions we
should care about – that is, questions about who should have final interpretive
authority and about what it is that they should be interpreting.
D. Deferentialist Restraint
1. Deferentialist Restraint and Interventionist Activism. The argument for
deferentialist restraint seems to stand in opposition to interventionist activism.
Interventionists want courts to force the political branches to intervene in the
private sphere. Believers in deferential restraint respond by asking why anyone
should think that judges are better able to decide when and how to control private
power than members of the political branches?
On closer analysis, though, there are two separate arguments for deferential
restraint that are in tension with each other: the argument from democracy, and the
argument from expertise. Both arguments ultimately rest on empirical questions
about the nature of political and judicial power, but depending on which argument
one embraces, the case for restraint may be more or less persuasive.
The argument from democracy is associated with the leftist critique of judicial
power advanced by populists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Like an earlier generation of republicans, advocates of this position valued popular
deliberation and the right of a community to determine its own destiny.206 On this
view, the judiciary as a “deviant institution”207 whose power is always suspect
because it is shielded from popular control.
In contrast, the argument from expertise is associated with the leftist critique of
judicial power advanced by progressives in the first third of the twentieth century.
Progressives thought that public policy questions were complicated, that getting the
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answers “right” required deep empirical investigation, and that expert judgments
were necessary to control popular ignorance and prejudice. On this view,
democracy was hardly an unalloyed good. Expert administrators should be
shielded from popular control.208 But the view also made some progressives
suspicious of judicial power. Generalist judges were no match for these experts,
and judges were too often influenced by ideological conviction or mindless legal
formalism.209
How might the arguments for restraint premised on democracy and expertise be
countered? Consider, first, refutations of deferentialist arguments grounded in
democracy. Judicial interventionists might join advocates of expertise in doubting
the value of untrammeled democracy. As Madison argued at the beginning of the
republic, purely democratic politics leaves public policy open to factions motivated
by temporary emotion or selfish interests.210
A second sort of refutation endorses democracy in principle but plays off the
democratic defects that infect the political branches. Building on the pluralist
theories discussed above,211 judicial activists might attack the premise our political
branches accurately reflect the popular will.
Democratic deferentialists, in turn, have responses to both these arguments.
Many of them are prepared to concede that democratic majorities are not infallible
and that our political systems are not fully democratic, but they insist on making
comparative judgments. With all its faults, our political system is more democratic
than our judicial system which, after all, self-consciously prides itself in resisting
political pressures.212 And even if in principle the polity would be better served if
there were a role for wise statesmen who advanced the public good and stood above
the clamor and chaos of ordinary politics, there is no reason to believe that judges
are these statesmen. On the contrary, they argue, judges, themselves constitute a
See Michael Kazin, note x, supra, at 52 (noting progressive “skepticism about the masses” and
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faction. Throughout our history, they have defended the rights of the privileged
and powerful against the interests of ordinary Americans.213
Interventionists might respond to deferentialist arguments grounded in respect
for expertise by attacking the premised that the political branches have a systemic
advantage. Judges have subpoena power, benefit from an adversarial process, must
listen to and account for all the evidence, and usually give reasons for their
decisions. Are they really less able to understand the complexity of a public policy
problem than a member of Congress, who often has not read the legislation she
votes on?
The expertise argument is stronger in cases involving administrative agencies
(although the democratic critique is also stronger), but even there, something can
be said for the value of generalist judges. Because they are generalists, judges may
be less subject to capture and less likely to have blinkered views that have narrowed
because of too long and close an engagement with a particular problem.
All this leads back to the conclusion that the argument can only be settled
through debate about the kinds of people likely to become judges, legislators, and
administrators and about the value and actual workings of supposedly democratic
government. Deferentialism alone does not answer these questions, but it raises
them in a fashion that demands our attention.
2. Deferentialist Restraint and Libertarian Activism. Can deferentialist
restraint and libertarian activism be reconciled? As I have argued above,214 there
is less conflict between them than one might at first suppose. True, judges may
have no special knowledge about, say, when life begins or when it should end. But
for that very reason, libertarian activists want to vest the authority to make these
decisions in private individuals.
But this relatively simple point does not completely resolve the conflict. One
can concede that judges who remit questions to a private sphere are not making
official government policy on the contested question. Saying that individual
pregnant persons should decide when life begins is not the same thing as
proclaiming for everyone when life begins. But that fact should not blind us from
the reality that judges are making a choice. By striking down abortion laws, judges
213
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are delegating lawmaking authority to private individuals who get to decide for
themselves what the “law” is. If they were to uphold abortion laws, judges would
be affirming the right of putatively democratic majorities to make the choice.
When seen in this light, the question is not whether judges should be deferential,
but to whom they should defer. Deferentialists therefore challenge us to provide
reasons why judges should defer to individuals rather than to collective majorities.
The deferentialist point gains force with the recognition that all supposedly
“private” choices produced negative externalities. In the case of abortion, the most
obvious victim of these externalities is the fetus. Unfortunately, relying on this
externality leads us back to questions about the ontological status of the fetus as a
rights-bearer and, then, to the question whether that status should be determined
individually or collectively.
Even if we put to one side “victimization” of the fetus, though, there are
other groups harmed by individual abortion choices.
Potential fathers,
grandparents, and siblings might prefer a live birth. More broadly, abortion
opponents might believe that society as a whole might be harmed by a declining
population, by the inability to capture the positive externalities that a fetus would
produce if the fetus survived, or by the mere knowledge that the country in which
they live has become a killing field for fetuses.
Pro-choice advocates (and perhaps I should make clear here that I am one
of them) will no doubt be outraged by the mere expression of these interests. But
that is only because pro-choicers start with the assumption that abortion is an
“individual right” – that is that the strength of these supposed negative externalities
should be measured solely by the person seeking an abortion. But, deferentialists
ask, in a divided society where people disagree about the existence or strength of
externalities, why should judges be the ultimate arbiters?
Libertarian activists have a response. After all, judges must decide one way
or the other. Whether they uphold or invalidate abortion laws, they are deferring
to one side or the other. Moreover, libertarians might insist, judges are uniquely
well suited to mediate the struggle between public and private. Judges themselves
are government officials, and their rulings come with the imprimatur of state action.
But they are also at least partially shielded public pressure. They are the most
private of our public officials. Because they straddle the public/private line, they
are uniquely able to resolve the conflicting claims of the collective and the
individual.
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For these reasons, judges have the potential to wisely resolve arguments
about individual rights. Have they taken advantage of that potential? Answering
that question will turn on a close empirical examination of how judges have used
their power together with a normative judgment about how the power ought to be
used. For what it is worth, I once thought that judges used the power wisely enough
often enough to justify libertarian activism.215 I no longer hold that view. For
present purposes, though, the important point is that deferentialists force us to ask
whether the view is correct, and that this is the right question to ask.
IV. CONCLUSION: LOCATING ONESELF ON THE MAP
With this new map to guide them, participants in our constitutional
arguments can decide where they want to go. Are they libertarians or
interventionists, anti-discretionists or deferentialists? The map itself does not
dictate the preferred destination, but it does provide information that might
influence our choice. It identifies the territory that we must traverse, the obstacles
we must overcome to get there, the wrong turns we might make, and the terrain we
will occupy when we complete our journey.
There are, moreover, good reasons for using this map as opposed to its
competitors. This is a map that identifies the geographic features that should matter
to us. Maps that locate us regarding originalism and living constitutionalism are
ultimately guides to linguistic theory and interpretation. They are about the nature
of meaning and about how to read a text. Without in any way denigrating the value
of pursuing those questions in other contexts, they are far removed from questions
about how a polity should govern itself.
In contrast, the map I propose guides us when we consider the relationship
between democratic engagement and private commitments, the choice between
elite expertise and the popular will, the actual functioning of our political and
judicial branches, and the true meaning of freedom. Can there be any doubt that
these are the questions we should be addressing?
There are nonetheless two reasons to doubt whether this map will serve us well.
First, we should worry about whether the map has any relationship to territory that
actually exists. Like other models of constitutional argument, my approach must
confront a radically skeptical account of our practices.
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When one examines real judges and other constitutional advocates, most of
them do not fit consistently or comfortably within the categories that I have defined,
any more than they fit comfortably along the originalism/living constitutionalism
dimension.
For example, conservative justices criticize libertarianism when the subject
is abortion, but support it when the subject is guns.216 Similarly, liberal justices
who laud deferentialism concerning the scope of federal powers have no use for it
when the issue is the scope of executive power to protect national security.217
Neither side seems much interested in exploring the reasons for these
contradictions. Critics might therefore claim that instead of providing a guide to
choosing a destination, my map offers no more than a menu of rhetorical tropes that
participants use instrumentally to get to different places as the situation warrants.
Second, as I have already mentioned, the map I propose does not dictate a
destination. It cannot be used to settle arguments. Instead, travelers must determine
their destination by resolving issues concerning the relative merits of libertarianism
and interventionism or concerning the relative trustworthiness of judges and
politicians. These are not matters on which Americans agree. For camp counselors
who want to get us all going to the same place at the same time, the map is useless.
There are available responses to these criticisms and, at the risk of ending this
discussion on a defensive note, I provide them here.
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What are we to make of the complaint that I have mapped a kind of Never Never
land that bears no relationship to the terrain occupied by participants in our
constitutional practice? I have already expressed my own pessimism about the
prospects of discovering the actual determinates of judicial behavior.218 Judges act
from a baffling array of motives. They are affected by the legal materials brought
to their attention, by random facts in particular cases, by the strength of the
advocacy on either side, by their political and personal loyalties, by ideological
views concerning power and desert, by desire for professional advancement or for
acclaim, by the wish to appear consistent and principled, and, no doubt, by a host
of urges and prejudices that are not consciously available to them.219 Empirical
research can make some progress in sorting all this out, but we are kidding
ourselves if we think that it will ultimately yield a simple account.
It does not follow, though, that the map I suggest here has no value. I start with
a normative claim: Even if judges don’t, or don’t always come to decisions based
on the factors I outline here, they ought to. Because much of this article consists
of a defense of this claim, I won’t repeat the defense here.
Instead, I want to make a second point that takes hold even if judges
ultimately reject my normative claim. My map might encourage a judge who acts
inconsistently along, say, the libertarian/interventionist axis to ask why she is doing
so. If these decisions are not entirely random or irrational, the judge must be
following an alternative map that she prefers. Put differently, awareness of my map
might force judges to engage in useful reflection about what they are doing. If they
are acting inconsistently along the dimensions that I describe, they might revise
their practices to make them consistent. Alternatively, they might reject my map
and identify for themselves a system of thought according to which the practices
are consistent. Even if social scientists can’t sort out judicial behavior, judges might
be able to better understand for themselves what they are doing and why they are
doing it. The hope is that this reflection will produce wiser decision making.220
Perhaps this hope is unrealistic. It may be that judges as a class have no interest
in engaging in this kind of introspection or are not thoughtful or insightful enough
to do so. Perhaps they are ideological hacks or mindless decision machines who
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spit out results with no reflection at all. But even if judges are hopeless and the
skeptical account is accurate, my map might provide grounds for people who are
not judges to criticize judicial practices. Indeed, if the failure of judges to engage
in this kind of introspection demonstrates that the skeptical account is accurate, that
fact alone might go a long way toward settling disputes between believers in
activism and restraint.
That brings us to the second problem. Ultimately, Americans are divided
about whether we can trust judges, just as they are divided about the appropriate
role of government, the nature of civil liberties, and the legitimacy of market
outcomes. Locating oneself on my map requires resolving these issues for oneself,
and different people will resolve the issues in different, perhaps irreconcilable
ways. If one thinks that constitutional law serves as a crucial, mediating discourse
that holds the country together, then an account of constitutionalism that
emphasizes irreconcilable differences is worse than useless.
But although this is a familiar account of the purpose of constitutional law, it is
wrong. Constitutional law never has and never can settle the differences that divide
us. Throughout our history, constitutional law has provided a vocabulary that, for
better or worse, we have used to describe and argue about those differences, but it
has not resolved them. Neither Roe221 nor Dobbs222 will “settle” the issue of
abortion. Neither Brown223 nor Plessy224 has “settled” issues about race. No
Supreme Court decision will permanently resolve questions about the regulatory
state, the appropriate protection for minority rights, or the divisions between state
and national power.
The most that we can hope for constitutional law is that it will clarify the issues
that divide us, provide arguments for either side that people of good faith are bound
to consider, and encourage us to listen to each other with open minds. My hope for
the map that I offer here is that it will help accomplish these ends.
Oddly, though, the very fact that the map emphasizes rather than resolves our
disagreements might provide the basis for an overlapping consensus concerning the
question that should matter the most to us. Just because this account of
constitutional law rests on the existence of unresolvable issues about the merits, it
calls out for another kind of mediating discourse. That discourse cannot be based
on constitutional commands that, like it or not, must be obeyed. It certainly cannot
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be based on a linguistic or interpretive theory. Instead, it depends upon a
willingness to acknowledge the fact of political difference and to find ways to live
in a polity where the difference remains unresolved. It requires a set of norms
emphasizing tolerance, restraint in the use of power, openness to disagreement, and
willingness to work for shared goals like widespread prosperity, preservation of our
physical environment, and justice as we best understand it.
If the map outlined here helps us to reach that destination, then it has served its
purpose.

